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Abstract
This paper proposes a new panel data structural gravity approach for estimating
the trade and welfare effects of Brexit. The suggested Constrained Poisson Pseudo
Maximum Likelihood Estimator exhibits some useful properties for trade policy
analysis and allows to obtain estimates and confidence intervals which are consis-
tent with structural trade theory. Assuming different counterfactual post-Brexit
scenarios, our main findings suggest that UKs (EUs) exports of goods to the EU
(UK) are likely to decline within a range between 7.2% and 45.7% (5.9% and 38.2%)
six years after the Brexit has taken place. For the UK, the negative trade effects
are only partially offset by an increase in domestic goods trade and trade with third
countries, inducing a decline in UKs real income between 1.4% and 5.7% under the
hard Brexit scenario. The estimated welfare effects for the EU are negligible in
magnitude and statistically not different from zero.
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1 Introduction
On Thursday, 26th of June 2016 the United Kingdom (UK) held a “Brexit-referendum”
and the majority of the participating electorate voted in favor of the “leave choice”. As
a consequence David Cameron resigned as prime minister and Theresa May took over
office. On the 29th of March 2017, the government of the UK officially handed in a letter
in Brussels notifying the country’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) triggering
Article 50 of the “Treaty on European Union”. This initiated a two year time window for
the conclusion on a withdrawal agreement. Since then the UK and EU are negotiating
the terms for UK’s withdrawal. On Friday, 8th December 2017, both parties announced
sufficient progress on phase one negotiations dealing with issues related to citizens’ rights,
UK’s “divorce bill” and the Irish border for paving the way for discussions on the future
trade relationships.
During the period of political campaigning prior to (and also after) the referendum, the
likely economic costs and benefits induced by Brexit for both the UK and the EU have
been highly debated. Given the fact that the negotiators are still far away from reaching
a final agreement on all involved issues, an (ex-ante) estimation of the involved costs and
benefits is naturally surrounded by substantial policy uncertainty. Nevertheless, some eco-
nomic studeis tried to provide estimates on the costs and benefits by focusing on different
economic issues. Thereby, the potential effects of Brexit for bilateral trade between UK
and the EU and domestic welfare in both economic areas attracted the most attention
among economists and policy makers alike. With only one exception, all available anal-
yses point to a (maybe substantial) reduction in bilateral trade between the remaining
27 EU member states and the UK as a consequence of Brexit. This decline in economic
interactions would be accompanied by negative domestic welfare effects for both economic
areas. The magnitude of these estimates differ depending on the estimation approaches
applied, the data used and, most importantly, the counterfactual post-Brexit scenarios
assumed.1
This paper applies a novel approach for identifying the bilateral trade effects stemming
from Brexit in a unifying framework in the spirit of Allen, Arkolakis and Takahashi (2014).
In particular, we extend the Constrained Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Estimator
(CPPMLE) as suggested by Pfaffermayr (2017) for panel data and account for full endow-
ment general equilibrium effects as suggested by Yotov, Permantini, Monteiro and Larch
(2016). The panel data CPPMLE features some advantageous properties which are useful
for trade policy evaluation. First, the panel data CPPMLE is able to accurately address
and solve the incidental parameter problem and thus allows to fully control for unobserved
heterogeneity across country-pairs. This is achieved by exploiting the restrictions imposed
by the system of multilateral resistances for estimation purposes (see Appendix A.3 for
more details). Specifically, this approach delivers unbiased estimates for the standard
1A more detailed account of the findings from previous Brexit studies applying (structural) gravity
models is offered in Section 2.
errors of the slope parameters. Second, it allows to apply the delta method for calculating
trade theory consistent confidence intervals which are important for accurately assessing
the uncertainty involved when applying various alternative post-Brexit trade policy sce-
narios. This approach might be preferable as compared to routinely applied bootstrapping
procedures. In the context of gravity models, bootstrapping the system of multilateral
resistance terms together with the parameter estimates is computationally intensive and
theoretical results on the reliability of the obtained confidence intervals are yet unavail-
able. With the data at hand and by applying the panel data CPPMLE, domestic trade
flows are fully explained by the included pair fixed-effects together with the trade resis-
tance terms as suggested by theory. As a consequence, all changes in international trade
flows are measured relative to domestic trade flows.
The empirical specifications of the gravity model suggested in this paper allow for phasing-
in effects in counterfactual policy scenarios such as e.g., the conclusion of new bilateral
free trade agreements by the UK. For this purpose, we follow Bergstrand, Larch and
Yotov (2015) and apply a distributed lag structure as only considering contemporaneous
trade policy effects likely only allows to identify lower bound estimates. Further, we al-
low for time trends in border effects. The paper also investigates the sensitivity of the
obtained Brexit effects with respect to the empirical identification of the parameter esti-
mates associated with trade policy measures. In the previous literature trade effects of
EU membership are either identified by means of an average effect stemming from all ex-
isting regional trade agreements (RTAs) or by accounting for EU membership indicators.
The former measure might be too broad in its definition as RTAs substantially differ in
their respective depths concerning the degree of trade liberalization. In datasets captur-
ing only recent time periods, the effects from EU membership seem to be driven by its
eastern enlargement which might not allow to obtain good estimates for UKs (additional)
trade costs induced by Brexit. As an alternative, this paper suggests to use information
on customs unions for identifying the (direct) trade effects of Brexit and empirically com-
pares this specification with the more commonly used one involving RTA indicators (only).
Most of the previous literature dealing with the trade effects from Brexit relies on different
versions and time periods of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) for estimating
direct trade policy effects (see, e.g., Brakman, Garretsen and Kohl 2017; Dhingra, Huang,
Ottaviano, Pessoa, Sampson and Van Reenen 2017; Felbermayr, Gro¨schl and Steininger
2017; Vandenbussche, Connell and Simons 2017). The WIOD mainly contains the most
developed economies around the world which are very actively engaged in free trade poli-
cies. As a consequence, this data source lacks exploitable (time-) variation in policy indi-
cators which makes it difficult to identify the causal trade effects of free trade agreements
and/or customs unions. Furthermore, input-output tables are technically constructed in
a way that the sum of the residuals for all trade relationships is zero. This is a very useful
property for the representation of input-output relationships but constitutes a drawback
for statistical inference as it puts specific restrictions on the error terms of any econometric
model applied. For this reason, we rely on a different and unique dataset which combines
various sources for bilateral trade, domestic trade and total production of manufacturing
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goods.2
For assessing the trade and welfare effects we apply four different counterfactual scenar-
ios. As mentioned above, we run two alternative empirical specifications of the gravity
model using either customs union data together with information on free trade agreements
(FTAs) or pool these two together into one single RTA indicator. These alternatives aim
at assessing potential heterogeneity in the trade creating effects of custum unions versus
FTAs. The usage of a single RTA indicator is more common in the Brexit literature,
and thus the alternative specifications provide insights into the sensitivity of the obtained
trade and welfare effects based on the choice of the empirical specification.
With regard to the potential outcomes of the Brexit negotiations we distinguish between
a “hard-” and “soft-Brexit” scenario. For the former, we assume that the UK will not
only leave the EU but also loses all current free trade agreements with third countries.
Furthermore, this scenario assumes that no new free trade agreement between the EU
and UK could be established. As a consequence, UK would trade with all countries in
the world based on the World Trade Organization regulations. As a consequence of this
scenario and in our data, the UK would be the only country not trading under any pref-
erential agreements in force. The “soft-Brexit” scenario assumes that all existing trade
agreements with third countries are inherited from the EU and remain in force. In the
first empirical specification, the UK leaves the EU as a member of the customs union, but
would trade with the EU under a newly established FTA. This scenario closely mimics
the “Global Britain” strategy proposed by the current government of the UK. Since the
second specification does not distinguish between customs unions and FTAs, the RTA
indicator is set to zero for all bilateral trade relationships between the UK and any EU27
member state while the RTAs with third countries remain in force. For the hard Brexit
scenario these bilateral trade agreements are additionally also set to zero.
Our estimation results reveal the following main findings: The trade distorting border
effects substantially decline over time pointing to the importance of using panel data for
trade policy evaluation. The cumulative RTA trade enhancing effect is qualitatively in line
with the results offered by Bergstrand et al. (2015) but in quantitative terms somewhat
smaller. This can be explained by the shorter time span covered in our data lasting from
1994 to 2012. A differentiation between customs unions and FTAs seems to be important
as the former increases bilateral trade by a significantly larger amount as compared to the
latter. As a consequence, relying on RTAs as a empirical combination of both customs
unions and FTAs might not deliver a very accurate estimate for the trade effects stemming
from Brexit.
The conducted counterfactual scenario analysis suggests that Brexit reduces EU-UK trade
2The data sources are discussed in detail in the Appendix A.4
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across all scenarios. This effect is substantially more pronounced for UK exports to the
EU as compared to its imports from the EU. Not very surprising the largest negative
trade effect would be induced by a hard-Brexit and when differentiating between customs
unions and FTAs. In this scenario, our model predicts an expected decrease in UK (EU)
exports to the EU (UK) by 35.5% (29.4%). In addition, our theory-consistent estimates
also reveal substantial uncertainty involved in the estimation of Brexit effects. For the
worst case scenario, the reduction in exports from UK to EU varies in a range between
25.3% and 45.7%. Furthermore, Brexit is estimated to exhibit “positive” trade diversion
effects by increasing domestic trade in the UK and also from trade with third countries.
Our model also identifies small but positive effects for intra-EU trade among the remain-
ing EU27 economies. The total net effect stemming from “negative” trade creation and
“positive” trade diversion is calculated via a standard measure for overall welfare effects.3
Or results suggest that, as a consequence of Brexit, real income in the UK will decline
in a range between (statistically significant) 0.3% and 5.7% while for the EU the esti-
mated welfare effects are statistically never different from zero. This finding points to an
asymmetry of the Brexit induced net costs to be borne by the UK and the EU, respectively.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the method-
ological approaches and findings from previous studies on the trade and welfare effects of
Brexit. For comparability, we limit the discussion to contributions which rely on (struc-
tural) gravity model estimation. Section 3 presents the panel data structural gravity model
while Section 4 discusses the empirical specification, details on the panel data CPPMLE,
presents the data used and reports the estimation results from the gravity model. Section
5 details the findings from the alternative counterfactual Brexit scenarios assumed. In
Section 6 we offer some concluding remarks and discuss the main policy implications.
2 The trade and welfare effects of Brexit: A brief
review of the literature
The scheduled referendum on UK’s future membership status in the EU triggered a series
of economic analyses which aimed at identifying the various costs and benefits of a poten-
tial win of the leave campaign. A detailed account of various potentially relevant economic
dimensions such as e.g., trade, investment and productivity is offered by Baldwin (2016),
Van Reenen (2016) and Sampson (2017). In the following, this section concentrates on
scientific contributions which put the trade and welfare effects of the Brexit at the cen-
ter of the respective investigations and applies (structural) gravity model estimation for
studying counterfactual Brexit scenarios. Table 1 provides a brief overview of the reviewed
studies displaying the various methodological approaches applied, the data sources uti-
lized and the main findings reported.
3The changes in welfare are based on the approach suggested by Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2014)
and can be interpreted as Brexit induced changes in real income.
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The first series of ex-ante investigations into the potential trade and welfare effects of
a leave vote in the Brexit referendum has been provided by national and international
(governmental) institutions including the HM Treasury (2016), Kierzenkowski, Pain, Rus-
ticelli and Zwart (2016) and the International Monetary Fund (2016). These studies are
reviewed in more detail in Gudgin, Coutts, Gibson and Buchanan (2017). The estimated
trade effects from Brexit are commonly based on ad-hoc formulations of gravity models
which do not take any type of general equilibrium effects explicitly into account. The
report prepared by HM Treasury (2016), for example, relies on aggregated bilateral trade
flow data (in logs) from the Glick and Rose database covering 200 countries for the years
from 1948 to 2013 and (mainly) applies simple fixed-effects estimators to gravity type
specifications. The trade effects of Brexit are modeled using two dummy variables for
trade creation and trade diversion due to the formation of the EU together with a sin-
gle market membership (EEA) dummy variable indicator and information on FTAs with
the EU. Other standard gravity variables capturing export demand and other trade costs
are included for isolating the trade effects stemming from EU membership. Applying this
very simple (atheoretical) gravity approach and assuming that WTO trade rules would be
applied in the aftermath of UKs withdrawal from the EU, the Treasury identifies potential
trade reductions amounting to approximately -20% in this case. Under a soft Brexit sce-
nario in which Brexit would be accompanied by the signing of a bilateral FTA between the
EU and the UK the negative trade effect would be smaller and add up to approximately
-17%. The investigations by Kierzenkowski et al. (2016) and the International Monetary
Fund (2016) deviate slightly in their modeling approaches and the time periods captured
for estimating the gravity models but, in quantitative terms, identified similar negative
trade effects stemming from Brexit.
Gudgin et al. (2017) comprehensively investigate the robustness of the findings from the
above mentioned national and international institutions (i) by closely mimicking the ap-
proach taken by HM Treasury (2016) and (ii) varying the sample composition, the time
span considered and the estimators applied. With regard to the latter, the authors alter-
natively also run their specifications relying on the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) estimator which avoids biased estimates by explicitly accounting for zero trade
flows and the inherently observed heteroscedasticity in bilateral trade flow data (San-
tos Silva and Tenreyro 2006). The findings of their robustness checks suggest that the
quantitative trade effects from Brexit identified by the HM Treasury (2016) should be
considered as upper bound estimates. However, all different sensitivity analyses carried
out by Gudgin et al. (2017) also indicate negative trade effects Brexit for both the EU as
well as for the UK.
A more structural approach for understanding both the short- and long-run welfare effects
of Brexit has been proposed by a research team working at the London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science based Centre for Economic Performance (Dhingra, Huang,
Ottaviano, Pessoa, Sampson and Van Reenen 2017). The authors apply a standard quan-
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titative general equilibrium trade model as suggested by Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare
(2014) for simulating total welfare effects of alternative post-Brexit scenarios. The paper
calibrate this model using trade in value added data stemming from the World Input-
Output Database (WIOD) for the year 2011 capturing 40 economies and 35 industrial
sectors. Accordingly, the resulting average welfare losses would be smallest, amounting
to -1.3%, in case of a soft Brexit in which the UK would remain in the EU single market.
Under the application of standard WTO rules, the average welfare losses for households
would be more than doubled amounting to -2.7%. Using reduced form regressions, Dhin-
gra et al. (2017) furthermore document severe setbacks for UKs productivity (and thus
competitiveness) due to Brexit induced reductions in foreign direct investments (FDI).
Accordingly, the negative income effects for UK households would be tripled and spread
almost evenly across the whole income distribution.
Vandenbussche et al. (2017) develop a gravity model with sector-level input-output link-
ages in production and separately study the impact of UKs withdrawal from the EU for
value added production and employment in the UK and for each EU member state. The
trade effects of Brexit are inferred by means of sectoral trade elasticities obtained from
Imbs and Me´jean (2017). This study also differentiates between a hard and soft Brexit
scenario closely following Dhingra et al. (2017). A hard Brexit would imply the appli-
cation of WTO rules together with high non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The soft Brexit is
defined as EEA membership including some NTBs (see Table 1 for further details on the
scenarios). The 2014 input-output data from WIOD are used for estimation. The main
findings of Vandenbussche et al. (2017) suggest that value added production in UK would
decrease between 1.21% (soft Brexit) and 4.47% (hard Brexit), inducing job losses in the
UK of around 140,000 to 530,000 jobs. In absolute terms a larger number of jobs would
be lost in the EU27 ranging between 280,000 and 1.2 million jobs.
The recent contributions by Brakman et al. (2017) and Felbermayr et al. (2017) are most
closely related to the work carried out in this paper. The former apply a structural grav-
ity model for bilateral trade flows taking account for full endowment general equilibrium
effects as proposed by Yotov et al. (2016). For this purpose, Brakman et al. (2017) es-
timate the gravity equation via PPML together with an iterative procedure which allows
to estimate and counterfactually change both the multilateral resistance (MLR) terms
and a country’s income level (i.e., full endowment general equilibrium effects). The es-
timated parameters for calculating counterfactuals is based on information on bilateral
trade agreements. This paper also investigates two alternative Brexit scenarios. The soft
Brexit scenario assumes that UK trades with the EU only under WTO rules, but retains
all bilateral trade agreements with third countries with which the EU has agreements in
force. Under the hard Brexit alternative, Brakman et al. (2017) assume that UK is able
to only trade under WTO regulation with all trading partners around the world. Empir-
ically, this study also relies on cross-sectional trade in value added data from the 2014
WIOD covering 43 countries. Their findings suggest that value added exports would drop
by 18% for the UK under the hard Brexit scenario and by about 14% under the alternative
soft Brexit. Furthermore, the results suggest that the “Global Britain” strategy in which
7
the UK signs bilateral trade agreements with all non-EU economies included in the WIOD
database would still not be sufficient to offset UK’s post-Brexit losses in trade with the EU.
In a similar vein, Felbermayr et al. (2017) also estimate a structural gravity model. This
paper, however, exploits the time-variation by using data from WIOD spanning the years
from 2000 to 2014, allow for heterogeneous trade effects of Brexit and also provide a
detailed analysis at both the sectoral- and country-level of disaggregation, respectively.
Similar to Dhingra et al. (2017), the identified trade effects enter as inputs for various
counterfactual scenario analyses in a new quantitative multi-country, multi-sector trade
model which has been developed at the Ifo Institute for Economic Research. This paper’s
main findings suggest that a hard Brexit scenario under which UK would trade only under
WTO regulation, would induce a welfare loss in the UK by approximately 2%. Within the
EU, welfare losses might be asymmetrically distributed and trade in services is estimated
to be most negatively affected by the Brexit. Under the alternative soft Brexit scenarios
the welfare effects are smaller and in many cases not statistically different from zero for
the EU27 economies.
This papers reconsiders the estimation of potential Brexit effects in a unifying frame-
work applying a panel data estimator which exploits the general equilibrium constraints
imposed by the system of multilateral resistances. The comparative static analysis ac-
counts for full endowment general equilibrium effects and explicitly assesses uncertainty in
the estimated Brexit effects for each counterfactul policy scenario using theory consistent
confidence intervals. Furthermore, we apply two alternative specifications of the under-
lying gravity model based on different trade policy indicators, i.e., customs unions and
FTAs versus RTAs. This paper utilizes a tailor-made dataset based on OECD’s STAN
and UNIDO’s production database for 65 economies for a time period spanning the years
from 1994 to 2012. As compared to the previously mentioned studies based on WIOD
data, our data source accounts for a larger number of newly formed free trade agreements
facilitating the identification of the potential trade effects from Brexit which, in turn, are
used for the counterfactual policy scenario analysis.
3 The structural panel data gravity model
Following the seminal contribution of Anderson and vanWincoop (2003), in a cross-section
of C countries observed over T periods bilateral trade flows are assumed to be generated
as
xijt
Yt,W
= t1−σijt κitΠ
σ−1
it P
σ−1
jt θjte
µijηijt := e
z′ijtα+βit(α,µ)+γjt(α,µ)+µijηijt.
Bilateral trade flows from country i to j in period t are normalized by world expenditures,
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defining sijt = xijt/Yt,W so that
∑C
i=1
∑C
j=1 sijt = 1 (see Allen et al. 2014). Time varying
trade frictions are modeled as t1−σijt = e
z′ijtα, while the country-pair fixed effect µij captures
time invariant unobserved bilateral barriers to trade. κit denotes the share of country i
in the value of world production, while θjt refers to the share of expenditures relative to
total world income. Thus the gravity model allows for exogenously determined multilat-
eral trade imbalances across countries. The countries’ production and expenditure figures
are as well assumed to be exogenously given. The disturbances are denoted by ηij, with
E[ηijt|zijt] = 1 and can be heteroskedastic or arbitrarily correlated in the exporter-time,
importer-time and country-pair dimensions, respectively (Egger and Tarlea 2015).
Multilateral trade resistances enter the model in normalized form as eβit(α,µ) = κitΠit(α, µ)
σ−1
and eγjt(α,µ) = θjtPjt(α, µ)
σ−1 and depend on the parameter vector α referring to trade
barriers, the pair specific fixed effects and on the number of countries in the sample.
For i, j = 1, ..., C and period t the reparameterized system of trade resistances can be
compactly written as
κit =
C∑
j=1
ez
′
ijtα+βit(α,µ)+γjt(α,µ)+µij , i = 1, ..., C − 1,
θjt =
C∑
i=1
ez
′
ijtα+βit(α,µ)+γjt(α,µ)+µij , j = 1, ..., C.
In the absence of any trade barriers (i.e., α = 0, µij = 0), one may set Πit(0) = ct and
Pjt(0) = 1/ct, where ct is a time-specific constant so that e
βit(α,µ) = ctκit and e
γjt(α,µ) =
θjt/ct. Since the solutions of the system of trade resistances are unique up to a constant,
without loss of generality, the normalized outward resistance term of country C is set to
0 for i = C. Furthermore, the country-pair fixed effects need to be normalized as well.
An observational equivalent parametrization reads as
β˜it = βit(α, µ)− βCt(α, µ) + µii,
γ˜jt = γjt(α, µ) + βCt(α, µ) + µjj,
µ˜ij = µij − µjj − µCj.
The first set of T restrictions normalizes inward and outward trade resistances setting
β˜Ct = 0. The second set of the 2C − 1 restrictions refers to pair fixed effects, from which
only (C−1)2 are identified in the presence of country-time specific trade resistance terms.
Here, µCj = µjj = 0 for j = 1, ..., C. Under this parametrization it follows that β˜Ct = 0,
µ˜ii = 0 and µ˜Cj = 0. The normalization of trade flows by Yt,W implies that there is no
constant in the model and without further structural assumptions on the DGP the value
of world production denoted by Yt,W remains unspecified.
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In order to obtain the full endowment general equilibrium effects (Yotov et al. 2016),
the system of multilateral resistances is reformulated to allow endogenous adjustments of
gross production and expenditures as a response to counterfactual changes in mill prices.
Specifically, in Appendix A.2 it is shown that the reparameterized system of multilateral
resistances can be written as
κit =
e
βit(α,µ)
1−σ hit∑C
k=1 e
βkt(α,µ)
1−σ hkt
=
C∑
j=1
ez
′
ijtα+βit(α,µ)+γjt(α,µ)+µij , i = 1, ..., C − 1,
θjt =
e
βit(α,µ)
1−σ
it hit∑C
k=1 e
βkt(α,µ)
1−σ hkt
θjt,0
κit,0
=
C∑
i=1
ez
′
ijtα+βit(α,µ)+γjt(α,µ)+µij , j = 1, ..., C.
where hit = b
−1
it
κ0it
p0it
= κ0ite
βit(α,µ)
σ−1 and the index 0 refers to the baseline scenario. For
estimation, κit and θjt are observed and are taken as given. However, the solutions of
counterfactual scenarios fully respect their endogenous adjustment. Allen et al. (2014)
prove that under a set of low level assumptions the equilibrium exits and is unique under
a proper normalization of the model.
4 Econometric model, data and estimation results
The specification of the structural gravity model follows Yotov (2012), Bergstrand et al.
(2015) and Heid, Larch and Yotov (2015) who argue that the impact of (bilateral) trade
policies are best identified in a model that includes domestic trade flows (i.e., from country
i to i), comprises a border dummy (Bij) taking the value 1 if i = j and 0 else which is
interacted with a time trend (t) to allow the (international) border effects to change over
time, and captures the evolution of international trade that may be different for more
distant trading partners and for neighboring countries. Hence, the border-trend variable
is additionally interacted with log(distij) and a dummy for contiguity contigij, respec-
tively. The inclusion of domestic trade flows allows to identify the parameters associated
with these three international trade related covariates. With regard to the counterfactual
scenario analysis, this empirical approach enables us to extrapolate secular globalization
trends beyond the estimation period for predicting short- and medium-run Brexit effects.
Furthermore, we include a dummy, DGR, which only takes on a value of 1 for the year 2009
and is zero otherwise. This variable is interacted with the border dummy and controls for
the short-run international trade reducing impact of the Great Recession.
Regional trade agreements, in general, reduce tariffs and possibly also non-tariff barri-
ers to international trade, but by definition do not affect domestic trade. Conceptually,
regional trade agreements may thus be thought of yet another determinant that reduces
(international) border effects. Following this reasoning, the dummy variables indicating
the presence of alternative types of international trade agreements are likewise interacted
with the border dummy. Moreover and in line with Bergstrand et al. (2015, p. 313),
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these interaction terms additionally enter the specification with 3-year and 6-year lags,
respectively, to account for phasing-in effects and sluggish adjustment of trade flows over
time.
The resulting empirical specification of the gravity model identifies the change of border
effects over time, but not their level, which is absorbed by the country-pair fixed effects. It
thus provides a clean measurement for the impact of changing trade barriers on bilateral
trade over time, since domestic trade flows serve as the base and are fully described by
the fixed country-pair effects and the trade resistance terms. For estimating the Brexit
induced trade effects, we apply two alternative specifications of the gravity equation.
Specification (1) differentiates between the impact of customs unions (such as the EU)
and FTAs, while Specification (2) subsumes CUs and FTAs in a single RTA indicator
variable. Formally these two specifications read as
sijt = exp (α1Bijt+ α2Bijcontigijt+ α3Bij log(distij)t+ α4BijDGR) (1)
∗ exp
(
2∑
k=0
α5+kBijCUij,t−3k +
2∑
k=0
α8+kBijFTAij,t−3k + µij + βit + γjt
)
+ εijt,
sijt = exp (α1Bijt+ α2Bijcontigijt+ α3Bij log(distij)t+ α4BijDGR) (2)
∗ exp
(
2∑
k=0
α5+kBijRTAij,t−3k + µij + βit + γjt
)
+ εijt.
The estimation applies the panel data CPPML estimator derived in Pfaffermayr (2017),
which assumes that gross production and expenditures are given and the system of multi-
lateral resistances holds in expectation. Furthermore, the estimation procedure eliminates
country-pair fixed effects like the standard panel PPML. The estimation uses a zig-zag
Gauss-Seidel algorithm, which is described in more detail in Appendix A.1. The main
advantage of constrained panel data PPML is that it delivers predictions that adhere to
the restrictions imposed by the system of trade resistances even in case of missing trade
flow data and this estimator is unaffected by the incidental parameters problem. The esti-
mated standard errors of the parameter estimates of the structural parameters α account
for these restrictions and are derived in more details in Pfaffermayr (2017). Appendix A.3
compactly discusses the calculation of the confidence intervals for counterfactual scenario
predictions. Moreover, this estimation procedure allows for three-way clustering across
country-pairs, exporter-time and importer time, respectively, as suggested by Egger and
Tarlea (2015). Since the multilateral resistances are functions of the estimated structural
parameters, the delta method can be applied to obtain standard errors for percentage
changes in trade flows and welfare based on the assumed counterfactual Brexit scenarios.
We use data on bilateral goods trade as well as compatible data on gross production, total
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exports and imports for total manufacturing for 65 countries. The bilateral trade flow
data and the unilateral data are consistent in the sense that the total value of exports of
a single country adds up to its production value and the value of all imports to its expen-
ditures, when accounting for domestic trade flows. Thereby, domestic trade is defined as
gross production minus total exports.4
The database covers the time period from 1994 to 2012 in three-year intervals and is
described in more detail the Appendix A.4. Trade flow data are taken from OECD’s
STAN database and Nicita and Olarreaga’s (2007) database. The data on gross produc-
tion, total exports and imports are collected from several sources (OECD-STAN, UNIDO,
CEPII and WIOD). These figures have been carefully checked to be consistent with the
trade data and it is ensured that none of them is missing. Thereby, a few data points
have been interpolated.5 A detailed description on the applied imputation procedures
for bilateral trade flows, gross production and expenditures is offered in Appendix A.4.
Population weighted distances and the dummy for contiguity is taken from Mayer and
Zignago (2011).6
The information on regional trade agreements stems from Mario Larch’s Regional Trade
Agreements Database (Egger and Larch 2008). This database provides dummy variables
indicating the presence of a customs union, a free trade agreement (FTA) and a regional
trade agreement (RTA). The RTA dummy covers both customs unions and FTAs and is
coded as 1 if either a customs union or a FTA is in force and zero otherwise. In Specifi-
cation (1) we separately estimate the bilateral trade effects of custom unions and FTAs,
respectively while Specification (2) pools all trade policy agreements together and esti-
mates average RTA effects. The second specification more closely follows the empirical
Brexit literature discussed above. Specification (1) aims at identifying potentially hetero-
geneous trade effects stemming from trade policy measures with varying depths in their
respective scope.
Table 2 reports the panel data CPPML estimation results from Specifications (1) and (2),
respectively. In our data only 4% of bilateral trade flows are missing and thus CPPML
and the standard PPML deliver rather similar parameter estimates. Overall, we find a
pronounced downward trend in the size of trade distorting border effects as indicated by
the positive border-time interaction effects. Furthermore, these estimates imply that, on
average, the share of international trade in world trade expands by 3.5% (Specification 1)
and 4.5% (Specification 2) per year.7 Yet, these are the estimated direct border effects
4This adding up property might be violated, however, under missing trade flows and unobserved
random measurement errors.
5In a robustness analysis, we check for the impact of data interpolation on the estimation results by
excluding these observations from the sample. The corresponding results are reported in Table A2 in
Appendix A.5.
6All data and the software codes of the imputation procedures are available from the authors upon
request.
7Recall, that the negative impact of international borders is fully absorbed by the fixed country-pair
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which neglect the associated changes in multilateral resistances. This finding, however,
is also well in line with the observed pattern in the data. Table A1 in Appendix A.5
shows that the shares of domestic trade flows in the UK, the EU and the rest of the
world (ROW) (substantially) declined from 1994 to 2012. Accordingly, domestic trade
has been increasingly substituted by international imports and exports. The interaction
of the border dummy with log distance indicates that the identified global trend of falling
international trade barriers is weaker for more distant trading partners. For neighboring
countries this trend is reinforced but not significantly so as can be inferred from the pa-
rameter estimates associated with the contiguity-time interaction term.
Table 2: Parameter estimates from panel data CPPML
Specification (1) Specification (2)
Parameter- t-value Parameter- t-value
estimate estimate
Border*time 0.17 4.75∗∗∗ 0.20 5.48∗∗∗
Border*contiguity*time 0.02 1.20 0.02 1.53
Border*(log) distance*time −0.01 −1.82∗ −0.01 −2.50∗∗
Border*Great recession 2009 −0.19 −4.87∗∗∗ −0.19 −4.55∗∗∗
Border*Customs union 0.13 1.99∗∗
Border*Custums union (t-3) 0.33 4.24∗∗∗
Border*Custums union (t-6) 0.03 0.45
Border*FTA −0.07 −1.36
Border*FTA (t-3) 0.25 3.64∗∗∗
Border*FTA (t-6) 0.11 1.67∗
Border*RTA −0.06 −1.24
Border*RTA (t-3) 0.25 3.49∗∗∗
Border*RTA (t-6) 0.14 1.90∗
Total customs unions effect 0.50 5.39∗∗∗
Total FTA effect 0.29 3.90∗∗∗
Total RTA effect 0.33 4.31∗∗∗
Notes: The panel comprises 7 periods of 3 years and 65 countries with with 1,138
out of 28,353 missing trade flows. Standard errors are clustered over country-pairs,
importer-years and exporter-years. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ ... Significant at 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level.
Further, the estimates suggest that customs unions substantially promote international
trade. Their impact on bilateral goods trade accumulates to an increase of 64.2% after
6 years as indicated by the total trade effect parameter which amounts to 0.5 and is
reported in the lower part of Table 2.8 Interestingly the formation of a FTA initially
induces an insignificant negative impact and its total accumulated bilateral trade effect
effects and that the positive parameter estimates indicate the “lessening’ of border effects over time.
8We use the approach of van Gardaren and Sha (2002) who suggest to estimate percentage changes
based on a parameter associated with a dummy variable in a semi log-specification, say c, by p̂c =
100(eĉ−0.5∗σ̂c − 1).
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after six years amounts to only 33.3%. The findings from Specification (1) thus point to
the relevance of distinguishing between customs unions and FTAs for trade policy analysis
(Baier, Bergstrand and Feng 2014). Specification (2) finds that RTAs exhibit an accumu-
lated trade enhancing effect of 38.7%. Given that FTAs are a more common trade policy
tool as compared to the establishment of customs unions, the estimate stemming from
the RTA indicator unsurprisingly is closer to the one from FTAs. All these estimation
results only refer to the measured direct effects of international trade agreements and do
not yet take general equilibrium effects into account. Overall, the estimated direct effects
are well in line with those in the literature and point to pronounced phasing-in effects of
trade agreements (see, e.g., Baier, et al. 2014; Bergstrand et al. 2015).
In Table A2 in Appendix A.5 we provide a detailed robustness analysis for the bilateral
trade effects stemming from trade policies. Accordingly, we re-estimate Specifications (1)
and (2) for modified and alternative data sources and apply some alternative specifica-
tions. First we exclude all imputed trade flows and obtain very similar estimation results.
Second, we alternatively use 3 year averages from the WIOD data spanning the years
2000 to 2012 and estimate gravity models for 42 mainly developed economies. This allows
to compare our findings more directly with the available literature as most other Brexit
studies rely on trade data based on input-output tables collected in the WIOD project
(see Table 1). Specification (1) yields a very similar estimate for the long-run impact of
customs unions, while the cumulative direct effect of FTAs and RTAs turns substantially
lower (0.12 and 0.13, respectively). Furthermore, the cumulative impact of FTAs is in-
significant in the WIOD sample. This finding indicates that WIOD data might not be
most useful for identifying accurate trade policy effects. Prior to the year 2000, the 42
included countries have already been very active in implementing free-trade policies which
result in small time-variation exploitable for estimation purposes. Table A3 in Appendix
A.5 documents this phenomena descriptively. The overall share of any free trade agree-
ment as captured by the RTA indicator shows substantially more time-variation in our
data as compared to the WIOD database. In 1994 only 18% of all bilateral trade relation-
ships profited from favorable market excess. Until 2012 this share increased to 38% in our
dataset. The share of RTA-affected trade relationships in the WIOD amounted to 44% in
2000 and increased to 57% in 2012. For the UK as an historically free-trade policy active
country, the share of RTAs is larger and especially in the WIOD database only increases
by 5 percentage points from 2000 until 2012.
The last two robustness checks modify the empirical specification with regard to the
time-trend assumed for the changing nature of border effects. The third set of columns
reported in Table A2 additionally includes an interaction term of the border dummy
variable with squared time. This allows the border effects to change non-linearly over
time. As indicated by the parameter estimates, this effect is zero which allows us to
rule out misspecification in the border-time effects. The last set of results corresponds
to a specification close to the one applied by Bergstrand et al. (2015). Accordingly,
the border dummy is not interacted with time assuming a time-constant trade distorting
effect for international versus domestic trade. The parameter estimate associated with
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the common border dummy is positive capturing the average increase in international
versus domestic trade. The total effects steeming from trade policies are, however, only
marginally affected. The customs union effect increase from 0.5 (Table 2) to 0.54 while
the FTA and RTA effects are reduced by 0.01, respectively.
In general, the results provided in Table A2 point to the robustness of our baseline es-
timates and further sheds some light on potential identification issues when relying on
the WIOD for evaluating the impact of trade policies on bilateral trade. In our case, the
trade enhancing effects of FTAs and more generally RTAs are substantially lower when
applying WIOD data. As a consequence, any counterfactual scenario which relies on these
parameters would identify smaller trade and welfare effects as compared to data provided
in OECD’s STAN database.
5 The trade and welfare effects of Brexit
The two alternative empirical specifications of the gravity model allow us to define four
counterfactual Brexit scenarios, two of which we classify as soft Brexit and two refer to a
hard Brexit. With the data at hand, we proceed as if Brexit materialized in 2012 (last year
of available observations) for identifying the short-run effects of the Brexit and calculate
out-of-sample predictions for t+ 3 and t+ 6 for obtaining medium-run effects.
The first scenario refers to the determination of UK’s membership in the customs union
formed be the EU countries. For the soft Brexit it is assumed that a free trade area with
the remaining EU member countries is established instead, while all trade agreements of
UK with non-EU countries remain unaffected by Brexit. The hard Brexit scenario based
on Specification (1) also abandons the membership of UK in the existing customs union
established by the EU. However, it is further assumed that a new arrangement of UK
with the EU countries cannot be established. In addition, this scenario also abolishes all
existing trade agreements of UK with third countries. As a consequence, in this scenario
the UK would not take part in any trade agreements and would trade under WTO rules.
Specification (2) subsumes all existing trade agreements into the single RTA indicator.
For the soft Brexit scenario this dummy variable is set to zero for the bilateral UK-EU
trade relationships, while the trade policy relationships of UK with all non-EU mem-
ber states would remain unaffected. As in Specification (1), the hard Brexit version of
this scenario additionally switches off all RTAs that the EU has established with third
countries. In all experiments we change the respective current and lagged dummies for
the trade agreements so that the trade impact of Brexit is immediately realized and the
alternative counterfactual scenarios account for phasing in effects in case UK would be
able to negotiate a new FTA with the EU. This implies that the immediate effect of a
new FTA is zero and only after three years a significant trade enhancing effect could be
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materialized (see Specification 1 in Table 2).
Tables 3 to 5 report the full endowment general equilibrium effects of Brexit that account
for changes in multilateral trade resistances, in gross production and incomes, respectively.
Besides the estimated general equilibrium effects the tables also report 95-confidence inter-
vals (in square brackets) that are based on the delta method and the panel data CPPML
as discussed in Pfaffermayr (2017). The tables document unweighted averages for groups
of bilateral trade combinations. In Table 3, the rows depict the Brexit induced changes in
bilateral exports from the first to the second economic region mentioned. The estimation
results corresponding to the rows denoted by UK-EU, for example, indicate the changes
in UK’s exports to the EU. Overall, we observe moderate changes in the Brexit effects
over time due to the secular trends in globalization. Thus, in our discussion we focus on
the estimated consequences of Brexit for the t+ 6 out of sample predictions.
5.1 The soft Brexit scenario
As shown above, the estimated long-run impact of customs unions on bilateral trade is
much higher than that of FTAs. Even if UK would be able to successfully negotiate a
new FTA with the EU member states a significant reduction in bilateral trade has to be
expected. Table 3 reports that under the soft Brexit scenario and Specification (1) the
structural gravity model predicts a reduction in UK-EU trade by -16.8% [-26.4%, -7.2%]
six years after the Brexit will take place and one of -13.8% [-21.7%, -5.9%] for the corre-
sponding flows from the EU to UK.9 The negative bilateral trade effects stemming from
the soft Brexit scenario are the largest in the year the Brexit will take place (most likely
in 2019) and the phasing-in effects of a potential EU-UK FTA will reduce the negative
trade effects by about 1.2 percentage points over six years. To a small extent, the UK will
be able to compensate this decline by an increase in trade with third countries (UK-ROW
3.0% [1.0%, 5.1%] and ROW-UK 6.0% [2,0%, 10.0%], respectively). The latter effects
indicate a positive trade diversion effect implied by UK’s withdrawal from the single mar-
ket. Imports from the ROW will become relatively cheaper (due to an increase in trade
costs for EU exports to the UK) and thus the ROW will gain from a Brexit via a 6%
(average) increase in its exports. In the long-run this might also have implications for
UKs trade balance with the ROW as exports from UK to the ROW are only increasing
by about 3%. Trade flows within the EU and also that of EU member states with the
ROW can be expected to be hardly affected by Brexit. Six years after the Brexit, the full
endowment general equilibrium model suggests an increase of within-EU27 bilateral trade
flows of about 0.4% which, however, is statistically not different from zero as indicated by
the lower bound of the confidence interval which takes on a value of -0.1%. Exports from
the EU to the ROW are estimated to increase by 0.7% under the soft Brexit scenario
when applying the direct trade effects stemming from Specification (1). This effect is
9In the following discussion square brackets indicate the boundaries of the 95% confidence intervals
obtained from the delta method.
16
Table 3: Brexit impact on international trade, full endowment general equilibrium
Soft Brexit Hard Brexit
%-change CI lower CI upper %-change CI lower CI upper
Specification 1
UK-EU t -18.06 -27.68 -8.44 -37.40 -47.59 -27.21
t+3 -17.19 -26.96 -7.41 -36.26 -46.54 -25.98
t+6 -16.81 -26.41 -7.21 -35.53 -45.71 -25.34
EU-UK t -14.42 -22.04 -6.80 -30.28 -38.89 -21.67
t+3 -13.87 -21.80 -5.93 -29.55 -38.33 -20.76
t+6 -13.78 -21.69 -5.88 -29.41 -38.19 -20.62
EU-EU t 0.39 -0.08 0.85 1.13 0.51 1.75
t+3 0.40 -0.08 0.89 1.17 0.54 1.81
t+6 0.43 -0.07 0.92 1.23 0.58 1.88
UK-ROW t 2.21 0.71 3.71 -3.21 -5.81 -0.62
t+3 2.64 0.86 4.41 -3.88 -6.65 -1.11
t+6 3.07 1.03 5.12 -2.84 -5.64 -0.04
ROW-UK t 5.83 1.91 9.74 5.79 2.14 9.45
t+3 5.88 1.93 9.83 4.64 0.97 8.31
t+6 5.99 1.98 10.00 4.86 1.12 8.59
EU-ROW t 0.73 0.27 1.19 1.60 0.96 2.25
t+3 0.71 0.26 1.17 1.51 0.89 2.13
t+6 0.71 0.26 1.15 1.50 0.89 2.11
ROW-EU t -0.14 -0.19 -0.08 -0.20 -0.36 -0.05
t+3 -0.11 -0.16 -0.06 0.06 -0.15 0.27
t+6 -0.08 -0.13 -0.03 0.12 -0.10 0.35
Specification 2
UK-EU t -26.12 -36.02 -16.23 -25.57 -35.28 -15.87
t+3 -25.56 -35.30 -15.81 -24.95 -34.47 -15.43
t+6 -25.00 -34.59 -15.41 -24.33 -33.68 -14.99
EU-UK t -20.91 -29.19 -12.63 -20.36 -28.34 -12.39
t+3 -20.80 -29.05 -12.55 -20.23 -28.17 -12.28
t+6 -20.67 -28.89 -12.44 -20.06 -27.96 -12.15
EU-EU t 0.71 0.17 1.25 0.67 0.14 1.20
t+3 0.75 0.19 1.31 0.71 0.16 1.25
t+6 0.79 0.22 1.36 0.74 0.18 1.29
UK-ROW t 3.15 1.26 5.05 -4.42 -6.41 -2.44
t+3 3.88 1.64 6.12 -3.67 -5.47 -1.87
t+6 4.61 2.02 7.20 -2.91 -4.58 -1.25
ROW-UK t 9.07 4.62 13.51 1.01 0.03 1.98
t+3 9.22 4.70 13.73 1.19 0.10 2.28
t+6 9.40 4.79 14.01 1.41 0.19 2.64
EU-ROW t 1.06 0.54 1.57 1.11 0.58 1.64
t+3 1.04 0.54 1.55 1.10 0.57 1.63
t+6 1.03 0.53 1.53 1.09 0.57 1.62
ROW-EU t -0.20 -0.26 -0.13 -0.07 -0.22 0.07
t+3 -0.15 -0.22 -0.08 -0.02 -0.18 0.13
t+6 -0.11 -0.19 -0.04 0.02 -0.15 0.19
Notes: Confidence intervals are calculated by the delta method (see Appendix A.2). CI lower and
CI upper denote the estimates for the two-sided 95% confidence interval. The rows depict the
Brexit induced changes in bilateral exports from the first to the second economic region mentioned.
UK-EU, for example, denotes the changes in UK’s exports to the EU.
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Table 4: Brexit impact on domestic trade, full endowment general equilibrium
Soft Brexit Hard Brexit
%-change CI lower CI upper %-change CI lower CI upper
Specification 1
UK t 7.94 2.44 13.45 19.66 10.91 28.42
t+3 8.46 2.58 14.34 21.60 12.05 31.15
t+6 9.03 2.77 15.30 23.17 12.92 33.42
EU t -0.03 -0.11 0.05 1.14 0.51 1.76
t+3 -0.04 -0.12 0.05 1.18 0.54 1.82
t+6 -0.04 -0.12 0.04 1.23 0.58 1.89
ROW t 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.14 0.39
t+3 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.39 0.23 0.56
t+6 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.39 0.23 0.56
Specification 2
UK t 12.34 5.79 18.89 14.00 6.40 21.59
t+3 13.30 6.25 20.35 15.11 6.91 23.30
t+6 14.30 6.72 21.89 16.26 7.44 25.09
EU t 0.71 0.17 1.26 0.67 0.14 1.20
t+3 0.75 0.19 1.32 0.71 0.16 1.26
t+6 0.79 0.22 1.37 0.74 0.18 1.30
ROW t 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.37 0.24 0.50
t+3 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.37 0.24 0.50
t+6 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.38 0.25 0.50
Notes: Confidence intervals are calculated by the delta method (see Appendix A.2). CI lower and
CI upper denote the estimates for the two-sided 95% confidence interval.
statistically significantly different from zero. The some holds true for the negative but
very small EU import effect from the ROW which, on average, amounts to -0.08%.
As hoped for by Brexit supporters in the UK, the soft Brexit scenario of Specification (1)
fosters domestic trade by 9.3% [2.8%, 15.3%] six years after the Brexit as indicated in Ta-
ble 4. Again, the immediate effect is very large and the adjustment over time is relatively
small. Furthermore, the reported confidence intervals document substantial uncertainty
in the domestic trade effect. The true effect most likely lies somewhere between 2.8%
and 15.3% where actual realizations close to one or the other boundary of the interval
would provide very different implications for the UK economy. This domestic trade effect
is again driven by relative increases in costs for goods provided from the EU. The increase
in relative costs induces a substitution of imports from the EU by relatively expensive
but domestically produced goods.
In line with standard trade theory such a substitution will induce a welfare loss as con-
sumers are faced with higher (average) prices after the Brexit has taken place. We cal-
culate the welfare effects of Brexit by applying the approach suggested by Costinot and
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Table 5: Welfare effects of Brexit, full endowment general equilibrium
Soft Brexit Hard Brexit
%-change CI lower CI upper %-change CI lower CI upper
Specification 1
UK t -1.29 -2.29 -0.28 -3.05 -4.85 -1.24
t+3 -1.37 -2.45 -0.29 -3.32 -5.33 -1.32
t+6 -1.46 -2.61 -0.30 -3.55 -5.73 -1.36
EU t -0.03 -0.11 0.05 -0.12 -0.22 -0.01
t+3 -0.04 -0.12 0.05 -0.12 -0.23 -0.02
t+6 -0.04 -0.12 0.04 -0.13 -0.24 -0.02
ROW t 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.07
t+3 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.07
t+6 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.07
Specification 2
UK t -1.96 -3.22 -0.71 -2.21 -3.69 -0.74
t+3 -2.11 -3.47 -0.75 -2.38 -3.99 -0.77
t+6 -2.26 -3.74 -0.78 -2.55 -4.31 -0.79
EU t -0.07 -0.16 0.02 -0.07 -0.15 0.02
t+3 -0.08 -0.17 0.02 -0.07 -0.16 0.02
t+6 -0.08 -0.18 0.01 -0.08 -0.17 0.02
ROW t 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
t+3 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.07
t+6 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.07
Notes: Welfare calculations based on the Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2014) formula. The value of
σ is chosen as 6.858 following Bergstrand et al. (2013, Table 1). Confidence intervals are calculated
by the delta method (see Appendix A.2). CI lower and CI upper denote the estimates for the
two-sided 95% confidence interval.
Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2014). The results are reported in Table 5. Accordingly, when applying
the soft Brexit scenario to Specification (1) the welfare effects from UK’s leaving of the
EU are most likely in the range of -1.5% [-2.6%, -0.3%]. For this calculation we assume
an elasticity of substitution of 6.98, the preferred estimate reported by Bergstrand, Egger
and Larch (2013, Table 1). The results suggest that under a soft Brexit scenario, in which
the UK would be able to negotiate a post-Brexit FTA with the EU, the welfare losses
from leaving the single market might not be too severe. Accordingly, UKs GDP would
be about 1.5% lower six years after the Brexit as it would be in the hypothetical scenario
in which the UK would have voted to remain within the EU. Table A4 in Appendix A.5
provides a robustness analysis for the calculated welfare losses. In particular, we are vary-
ing the elasticity of substitution such that it can take on the 1% critical values from the
confidence interval reported in Bergstrand et al. (2013). Table A4 documents that the
obtained welfare effects are not very sensitive to changes in the elasticity of substitution.
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5.2 The hard Brexit scenario
When focusing on the hard Brexit scenario, the Brexit induced consequences for bilateral
goods trade and welfare are much more pronounced for the UK. Specification (1) predicts
a decrease in UK exports to the EU by -35.5% [-45.7%, -25.3%]. Imports from the EU
are expected to decline by -29.4% [-38.2%, -20.6%]. In other words, in the worst case
UKs exports to the EU could drop by almost one half while the EU might also export
about 40% less manufacturing goods to the UK. In this scenario, UK will also not be able
to maintain its trade preferences with all non-EU countries and thus it would be sub-
stantially harmed by trading under WTO rules only. The counterfactual scenario results
thus further suggest a reduction of UK-ROW trade by -2.9% [-5.6%, -0.04%] but the UK
imports from the ROW would increase by 4.9% [1.1%, 8.6%]. The hard Brexit scenario
thus would imply a substantial worsening in UKs trade balance with all other countries
around the world including the remaining EU member states and would definitely make
the UK a much more closed economy as it is today.
This fact is underlined by the tremendous increase in domestic trade induced by a hard
Brexit which is reported in Table 4. Accordingly, six years after the Brexit has taken place
domestic trade would be increased by 23.2% [12.9%, 33.4%], which is more than twice
the number estimated for the soft Brexit scenario using the same empirical specification.
Similar to the soft Brexit scenario, the EU27 economies are in total only marginally af-
fected in terms of domestic trade and welfare effects although the trade conditions would
be significantly worsened. The large increase in domestic trade of relatively expensive
goods in the UK also translates into larger welfare losses to be expected. Six years after
the Brexit has taken place UKs GDP is thus estimated to be about -3.5% [-5.7%, -1.4%]
lower under the hard Brexit scenario. Based on our estimates, a hard Brexit would more
than double the economic costs stemming from Brexit via trade in manufacturing goods
only.
5.3 The regional trade agreements specification
As compared to the results obtained from Specification (1), the differences in the effects
between hard and soft Brexit are smaller when applying Specification (2), which estimates
a significant direct long run RTA effect of 38.7% (see discussion above). Applying an es-
timator which is based on a weighted average of custom unions and FTAs for studying
Brexit delivers larger (smaller) effects for the soft (hard) Brexit scenario. Six years after
a Brexit bilateral exports from the UK to the EU are estimated to decline by -25.0%
[-34.6%, -15.4%] in the soft Brexit scenario while under a hard Brexit the effects would
be smaller -24.3% [-33.7%, -15.0%]. Domestic trade is estimated to increase by 14.3%
[6.7%, 21.9%] after a soft Brexit and by 16.3% [7.4%, 25.1%] in case of a hard Brexit.
This would translate into corresponding welfare losses of -2.3% [-3.7%, -0.8%] and -2.6%
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[-4.3%, -0.8%], respectively. The estimated welfare effects for the EU member states are
again economically negligible and statistically not different from zero.
The estimated impact of Brexit on trade and welfare compares well to the findings avail-
able from the literature which are reported in Table 1. The results support the need for
the UK to establish trade agreements with non-EU economies in order to at least par-
tially compensate for the reduction in trade with single market member states. Given
the geographic location of UK and the still prevalent burden of large distances for inter-
national trade, trade agreements with non-EU countries will most probably become not
as economically successful as UKs integration into the European single market. Against
this backdrop, Brexit will most likely come with some economic costs stemming from a
(substantial) decline in trade with the remaining EU27 economies.
However another important aspect to note is that we observe considerably large confidence
intervals of the estimated full endowment general equilibrium effects despite the fact that
most of the parameters are estimated with high precision as indicated by the large t-
values (in absolute numbers) attached to most of them. This implies that the uncertainty
induced by the estimation of the structural gravity model is substantial and documents
the need to apply a theory-driven approach for estimating and predicting the trade and
welfare effects of trade policy measures. It also reveals that the provision of some average
effects based solely on the parameter estimates might not be very informative for policy
makers, as the broad bandwidth of possible effects provides important additional infor-
mation on the likely impacts stemming from alternative post-Brexit scenarios.
6 Conclusions
This paper studies the Brexit induced welfare effects stemming from trade in manufac-
turing goods by applying an estimation approach which allows to estimate counterfactual
scenario outcomes consistent with structural trade theory and to exploit the system of
multilateral resistances for calculating confidence intervals. In this regard, the suggested
approach naturally takes the uncertainty surrounding the Brexit negotiations explicitly
into account and allows to present a meaningful bandwidth for the possible general equi-
librium trade effects for the UK, the EU and the ROW, respectively. Furthermore, this
approach enables us to estimate both immediate and medium-run trade effects stemming
from Brexit by exploiting the panel structure in the data which allows to model phase-in
effects in the counterfactual trade policy scenarios. Furthermore, by combining the pro-
posed panel data structural gravity estimator with the full endowment general equilibrium
model suggested by Yotov et al. (2016) we are able to assess the manufacturing trade
induced welfare effects from Brexit.
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The estimation results suggest that the largest adverse trade and welfare effects are to
be expected in case of a hard Brexit in which UK would only trade under WTO rules.
The formation of free trade agreements with other countries as suggested in the Global
Britain strategy would most likely be able to dampen these negative effects but would
not fully compensate for the withdrawal from the European single market. Across all
different scenarios, the negative trade effects of Brexit are accompanied by a substantial
increase in domestic trade within UK and with some minor increase in trade with third
countries. Thereby, the the imports from the ROW will increase by more as the exports
from UK to ROW. In the long-run this can also have important implications for UKs
trade balance with all non-EU member states. In contrast, intra-EU trade is estimated
to only marginally increase after UKs leaving of the EU.
The estimated (positive and mainly domestic) trade diversion effects are not sufficient
to fully compensate for the losses stemming from reduced trade with the EU. Our cal-
culations for the welfare effects suggest a Brexit induced decrease in UKs real income
(real GDP) in a range between 0.3% and 5.7%. This effect is driven by a substitution
of relatively cheap imports of manufacturing goods from the EU27 by relatively expan-
sive domestic production. EU27s welfare, by contrast, is not statistically significantly
affected by UKs withdrawal from the EU. For the whole EU the trade relationships with
the UK are not as important as these economic ties are for the UK. As a consequence,
our estimates suggest substantial costs likely to be triggered by Brexit which have to be
borne by both economic areas. However, the expected decline in bilateral trade flows of
manufacturing goods will be much more damaging for the UK.
Furthermore, our findings should be considered as a lower bound estimates of the potential
overall economic costs involved in the Brexit. In this paper we are not considering other
channels for bilateral economic relationships such as migration, trade in services and FDI.
Similar to the trade effects, it is very likely that bilateral FDI flows between both economic
areas are also declining with potential adverse effects on UK’s productivity (Dhingra et
al. 2016). Furthermore, due to data limitations we are only able to investigate the Brexit
effects for manufacturing goods trade. According to Felbermayr et al. (2017), the trade
distorting effects of Brexit might be even more pronounced for the services sectors. Thus,
the negative welfare effects stemming from reduced bilateral trade of services might be
larger as the ones identified from manufacturing goods. This in turn would increase the
overall welfare losses associated with UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
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A Appendix
A.1 Constrained Panel PPML estimation
For estimation purposes, the structural gravity model can be reformulated in an abbrevi-
ated notation with additive disturbances
sijt = mijt(ϑC) + εijt, εijt = mijt(ϑC) (ηijt − 1) ,
where mijt(ϑC) = e
z′ijtα+βit(α,µ)+γjt(α,µ)+µij , ϑC = [φC(α, µ)
′, µij]′, φC = [α′, β′C(α, µ),
γ′C(α, µ)]
′ and the tilde notation for restricted parameters is skipped.
Constrained Panel PPML uses nested iterations in a partial Gauss-Seidel algorithm (Guimarares
and Portugal 2010; Smyth 1996) that avoids the inversion of large matrices if the country-
pair dummies are included. In each iteration step r the iterative estimation procedure
calculates the following vectors and matrices:
m̂ijt,φ,r = e
z′ijtα̂r+βit(α̂r,µ̂r)+γjt(α̂r,µ̂r)
m̂ijt,r = m̂ijt,φ,re
µ̂ij,r
M̂r = diag(m̂ijt,r)
Q̂µ,r = M̂rV − M̂rV Dµ
(
D′µV M̂rDµ
)−1
D′µV M̂r
Ĝr = W
′
φQ̂µ,rWφ, Wφ = [Z,Dφ]
F̂r = D
′
φQ̂µ,rWφ
where Ĝr is assumed to be non-singular. Dµ denotes the dummy design matrix for the
country-pair effects, whileDφ comprises the dummies for the multilateral resistance terms.
V is a diagonal matrix with ones for observed trade flows and zero for missing ones.
Given the results of iteration step r, step r + 1 proceeds with the following calculations:
1. φ̂r+1 = φ̂r +
(
Ĝ−1r − Ĝ−1r F̂ ′r
(
F̂rĜ
−1
r F̂
′
r
)−1
F̂rĜ
−1
r
)
W ′φV (s− m̂r)
+Ĝ−1r F̂
′
r
(
F̂rĜrF̂
′
r
)−1 [
θC −D′φm̂r
]
m̂ijt,φ,r+1 = e
z′ijtα̂r+1+βit(α̂r+1,µ̂r)+γjt(α̂r+1,µ̂r)
2. µ̂r+1 = ln
((
diag(D′µV m̂φ,r+1)
)−1
θµ
)
m̂ijt,µ,r+1 = e
µ̂ij,r+1
3. m̂ijt,r+1 = m̂ijt,φ,r+1m̂ijt,µ,r+1
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4. Iterate until convergence of φ̂r and µ̂r.
Step 2 of the procedure shows that the country-pair fixed effects (µij) are fully deter-
mined by the country-pair means of the bilateral trade flows θµ and the other structural
parameters and do not need to be estimated explicitly (see Wooldridge 1999). Hence, the
inference is conditional on θµ.
A.2 Full endowment general equilibrium
Following Yotov et al. (2016), we write demand as
sijt = (pibittijt)
1−σ θjtP σ−1jt
Pjt =
(
C∑
j=1
(pitbittijt)
1−σ
) 1
1−σ
,
where bit is a preference parameter or may be determined by another isomorphic model.
Market clearing implies
κit =
C∑
j=1
sijt =
C∑
j=1
(pibittijt)
1−σ θjtP σ−1jt = (pitbit)
1−σ
C∑
j=1
t1−σijt θjtP
σ−1
jt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π1−σit
and
(pitbit)
1−σ = κitΠσ−1it → pit = 1bit
(
κitΠ
σ−1
it
) 1
1−σ .
To obtain the full endowment general equilibrium effects of counterfactual changes in
trade barriers, the impact on factory gate prices and thus on the value of production has
to be considered in addition to the impact on nominal trade flows. Production may be
written as
Yit = pit
Yit,0
pit,0
.
The index 0 refers to the initially observed values in the baseline situation.10 Using the
parametrization in the text
pit = b
−1
it
(
κitΠ
σ−1
it
) 1
1−σ = b−1it e
βit(α,µ)
1−σ
pit
pit,0
=
b−1it e
βit(α.µ)
1−σ
b−1it e
βit,0(α,µ)
1−σ
= e
βit(α,µ)−βit,0(α,µ)
1−σ
10In an endowment economy Y0ip0i denotes country i’s the endowment.
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and production and expenditure shares can be written as
κit =
pit
pit,0
Yit,0
Yt,W∑C
k=1
pkt
pkt,0
Ykt,0
Yt,W
= e
βit(α,µ)−βit,0(α,µ)
1−σ κit.0∑C
k=1 e
βkt(α,µ)−βkt,0(α,µ)
1−σ κkt,0
θjt =
pit
p0it
θjt,0 = e
βit(α,µ)−βit,0(α,µ)
1−σ θjt,0.
(3)
Note this specification holds initial trade deficits constant, which remain unexplained and
are taken as given.
A.3 The confidence intervals for counterfactual scenario predic-
tions
The standard errors for comparative statics under the full endowment general equilibrium
are obtained via the delta method, since the multilateral resistance terms are functions
of the estimated structural parameters only. For a given period t the percentage change
of a group of country-pairs’ trade flows selected by a matrix R is asymptotically normal
(Pfaffermayr 2017), i.e.,
CR
(
M0t (α̂)
−1mt(α̂)−M0t (α0)−1mt(α0)
) d→ N(0, R (Υ−Υ0)Vα (Υ−Υ0)′R′)
where superscript 0 again refers to the baseline. Taylor series expansion can be shown to
yield for period t
Υt(α) = M
0
t (α)
−1Mt(α)
∗
((
IC2 −Dt [D′tMt(α)Dt −Ht(α)]−1D′tMt(α)
)
Zt
+ Dt [D
′
tMt(α)Dt −Ht(α)]−1Ht(α)
(
D′tM
0
t (α)Dt
)−1
D′tM
0
t (α)Z
0
t
)
Υ0t (α) = M
0
t (α)
−1Mt(α)
(
Z0t −Dt
(
D′tM
0
t (α)Dt
)−1
D′tM
0
t (α)Z
0
t
)
R
(
Υ−Υ0) = lim
C→∞
R
(
Υt(α0)−Υ0t (α0)
)
.
This uses
Ht(α) =
[
1
1−σ
(
diag(hx,t)− hx,th′x,t
)
0
1
1−σ
(
diag(hm,t)− hm,th′x,t
)
0
]
with hit =
e
µit
(1−σ) κit∑n
k=1 e
µkt
(1−σ) κkt
, hx,t = (h1t, ..., hC−1,t)′, hm,t =
(
h1t
θ01t
κ01t
, ..., hC−1,t
θ0C−1,t
κ0C−1,t
,
θ0Ct
κCt0
)
and
ht = (h
′
x,th
′
m,t)
′. Note, R(Υ−Υt(α̂)) = op(1) and R(Υ0 −Υ0t (α̂)) = op(1).
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A.4 Data base
The empirical analysis focuses on trade of manufacturing goods observed over periods
of 3 years during 1994-2012. The panel is based on several data sources. The primary
data source is OECD’s-STAN data base that reports consistent figures for bilateral trade
flows, total exports, total imports and gross production, however the latter three figures
only for OECD economies. Trade flows are measured in nominal cif-values as reported
by the importing country. To obtain a larger group of countries and more observations
on trade flows, the trade data had been augmented by Nicita and Olarreaga’s (2007)
Trade, Production and Protection database. This database comprises consistent data on
bilateral trade flows including mirrored ones for a large set of countries. Missing bilateral
trade flows from the STAN database have been imputed from this database using bilateral
STAN trade flows as the dependent variable in a PPML framework. Explanatory variables
are the log trade flows of Nicita and Olarreaga (2007), the log of mirrored values inter-
acted with a missing dummy for World Bank data as well as exporter, importer and time
effects. This procedures allows to impute 43,531 annual missing trade flows. However, not
all observations on trade flows can be used due to missing data on gross production. The
robustness section thus re-estimates the structural gravity model considering all imputed
trade flows as missing (see Table A2 in Appendix A.5).
STAN’S data on gross production have been augmented by UNIDO’s and CEPII’s data
bases (De Sousa, Mayer and Zignago 2012), respectively, again using PPML to regress
gross production on the log of its counterparts in UNIDO and CEPII along with inter-
actions of log production with country and year dummies as well as country and year
dummies themselves. Overall 277 observation on gross production have been imputed
from CEPII and the 279 from UNIDO. In a few cases (CYP, BEL, EST, NLD, IRL, LUX,
LTU, SVK, SVN) these production data turned inconsistent with trade flow data and
information from WIOD has been used instead. In this way the set of countries with
consistent trade and production data could be expanded to 65. The same imputation
procedure has been applied for total exports and imports. Here additional data sources
are aggregates from the Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) database and 478 values for total
exports and 556 for total imports had been imputed. Finally, a in a few cases data have
been interpolated.
The data on trade flows, xijt, production, Yit, and expenditures, Eit, are corrected for trade
with the rest of the world as well as for trade imbalances which have been taken as given.
The total production value of country i at time t is given as xi.t =
∑C
j=1 xijt + xi,ROW,t,
while total expenditures can be derived as x.it =
∑C
j=1 xjit + xROW,i,t. This implies the
trade balance of a country i are defined as dit = xi.t− x.it. Since data are available for 65
countries, exports to the rest of the world (ROW) and imports from ROW of country i at
time t have been aggregated in xi,ROW,t and xROW,i,t. Domestic shipments are implicitly
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defined as
κit =
xit. − xi,ROW,t
Yt,W
= siit +
C∑
j =i
sijt,
while expenditures net of imports to ROW are given as.
θjt =
x.jt − dit − xROW,j,t
Yt,W
= siit +
C∑
h =i
shit.
Thereby, Yt,W denotes overall (world) production or expenditures for the 65 countries.
Note that
∑C
i=1 dit = 0 holds per definition and that
∑C
i=1 κit =
∑C
j=1 θjt = 1.
The dataset includes the following 65 countries: Albania, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indone-
sia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Tanzania, Turkey, Ukraine, United kingdom, United States of America and Uruguay.
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A.5 Additional tables and robustness results
Table A1: Share of trade flows in world trade by country-pair group
Country-pair group 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012
UK, domestic 0.027 0.029 0.025 0.023 0.020 0.012 0.011
EU, domestic 0.183 0.172 0.154 0.170 0.148 0.126 0.092
ROW, domestic 0.581 0.554 0.548 0.517 0.524 0.585 0.575
UK-EU 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.006
UK-ROW 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005
EU-UK 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.009
ROW-UK 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.007
EU-EU 0.057 0.065 0.068 0.081 0.084 0.077 0.075
EU-ROW 0.025 0.030 0.031 0.035 0.037 0.035 0.043
ROW-EU 0.024 0.026 0.031 0.034 0.038 0.036 0.038
ROW-ROW 0.077 0.094 0.112 0.109 0.119 0.105 0.139
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Table A3: Share of trade flows covered by international trade agreements
Stan database WIOD database
Customs Unions FTAs RTAs Customs Unions FTAs RTAs
All country-pairs
1994 0.05 0.14 0.18
1997 0.07 0.16 0.23
2000 0.07 0.19 0.25 0.15 0.29 0.44
2003 0.07 0.21 0.27 0.15 0.32 0.47
2006 0.14 0.18 0.33 0.34 0.19 0.53
2009 0.16 0.17 0.34 0.40 0.14 0.54
2012 0.16 0.22 0.38 0.40 0.18 0.57
UK
1994 0.19 0.23 0.42
1997 0.23 0.25 0.48
2000 0.23 0.28 0.51 0.39 0.31 0.70
2003 0.23 0.31 0.54 0.39 0.34 0.72
2006 0.36 0.20 0.56 0.58 0.14 0.72
2009 0.39 0.17 0.56 0.63 0.10 0.72
2012 0.39 0.20 0.59 0.63 0.12 0.75
Notes: In Mario Larch’s Regional Trade Agreements Database RTAs are defined as the sum of
customs unions and FTAs.
Table A4: Robstness analysis: Welfare effects of of a soft Brexit, full en-
dowment general equilibrium. Specification (1)
σ = 6.858 σ = 7.106
%-change CI lower CI upper %-change CI lower CI upper
UK t -1.31 -2.34 -0.29 -1.26 -2.25 -0.27
t+3 -1.39 -2.50 -0.29 -1.34 -2.40 -0.28
t+6 -1.49 -2.67 -0.30 -1.43 -2.56 -0.29
EU t -0.03 -0.11 0.05 -0.03 -0.11 0.05
t+3 -0.04 -0.12 0.05 -0.03 -0.11 0.05
t+6 -0.04 -0.12 0.05 -0.04 -0.12 0.04
ROW t 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
t+3 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
t+6 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05
Notes: Welfare calculations based on the Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2014) formula.
The values of σ are chosen based on the 1% confidence intervals reported in Bergstrand
et al. (2013). Confidence intervals are calculated by the delta method (see Appendix
A.2). CI lower and CI upper denote the estimates for the two-sided 95% confidence
interval.
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